The panelists were:

Kola Abimbola, Copeland Research Fellow, Amherst College

Marianne Belis, Professor, École Centrale d'É lectronique

Ward Edwards, Professor Emeritus, University of Southern California & President, Wise Decisions, Inc.

Paolo Garbolino, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, School of Humanities, Scuola Normale Superiore

Ronald Howard, Professor, Department of Engineering, Economic Sys tems and Operations Research & Professor, Graduate School of Business & Director, Decisions & Ethics Center, Stanford University

Kathryn Blackmond Laskey, Associate Professor of Systems Engineering and Operations Research, George Mason University

Melanie Leslie, Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University

Tod Levitt, President, Information Extraction & Transport, Inc.

Marilyn MacCrimmon, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia

David Poole, Professor of Computer Science, University of British Columbia

David Schum, Professor of Operations Research and Engineering & Professor of Law, George Mason University

Glenn Shafer, Professor, Department of Accounting and Information Systems, Graduate School of Management, Rutgers University

Paul Snow, Statistical Consultant

Peter Tillers, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University

Vern Walker, Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law

Conference Chairs: Marilyn MacCrimmon & Peter Tillers

Symposium Coordinator: Craig J. Brody, cjbrody1@yahoo.com

• But what _is_ artificial intelligence? Professor John McCarthy of Stanford gives us his answers -- and a very useful primer -- at the following web site: http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/whatisai/whatisai.html

  • Professor McCarthy, by the way, published a paper in 1979 in which he argued that thermostats (can be said to) have mental states and beliefs. See http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/ascribing/ascribing.html

The Cardozo symposium in New York City and a program at a conference in Amsterdam http://www.eurocongres.com/criminallaw/fr_programme.html explored the implications of artificial intelligence and AI-related disciplines and methods for the study and practice of forensic investigation and proof. One important theme of the symposium was the dynamic nature of judicial proof; some panelists discussed the possible contributions of artificial intelligence to the study and management of forensic investigation and proof in unstable and changing environments.

Another important theme was the logical properties of inference and proof in forensic settings. Various other matters and issues were considered. For example, some panelists viewed judicial proof through the prism of decision theory.

The organization of the Cardozo symposium and the Amsterdam program reflected a broad interpretation of the scope of "artificial intelligence."

For further information about the symposium please see

http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/cardlrev/symp.html

Please see further below on this page for a detailed symposium program and schedule.

The panelists and participants in the symposium on artificial intelligence and judicial proof were invited to discuss the following hypothetical case (and, if they found the case below inapt, uninstructive, or malformed, they were invited and encouraged to construct and present a case more to their liking):

  Grist for Your Preferred Mode of Analysis:

A Hypothetical Case

Your name is Able Attorney. Your nickname is Slick. You are a lawyer. You work in Middletown, Middle State, U.S.A. The date is October 5, 1999. The time is 8:45 a.m. You have just arrived in your office. Just then Dale, your legal secretary, ushers Peter Plaintiff into your office. Dale explains that Peter has asked to see you. You are irritated; you haven't had a chance to drink your coffee, check your phone for messages, or consider whether you even want to see Peter. Nonetheless, you say, "I'm very glad to meet you, Peter. You don't mind if I call you Peter, do you? How can I help you?"

Peter tells you that he wants to explore the possibility of bringing a personal injury action against the owner of a "convenience" store. You ask Peter for details.

Peter tells you that he was shot in the head by a clerk at a "Happy Valley" store in Madison City, in Middle State, a few months ago. He explains that he thinks that the clerk who shot him was either negligent, reckless, or malevolent. Peter adds, "I personally lean toward the malevolence hypothesis. I know that clerk. He's a vicious s.o.b. His name is Harry. His nickname is Dirt. And that's no accident."

You ask Peter for further details. He tells you that he went to the Happy Valley store on the night of April 1, 1999. He says that he remembers entering the store at 10:45 p.m. He also vividly remembers seeing a blinding flash immediately after entering the store. "The next thing I remember," Peter says, "is coming back to consciousness just as two white-coated men were carrying me out of the convenience store on a stretcher."

Peter adds, "They took me to a hospital -- General Hospital -- where I stayed for about three months. When I got to the hospital that night, the doctors told me I had been shot in the head. They took me right into surgery. Later I had two more operations. I'll probably have several more. I hope you'll keep this in mind. I don't talk or think as well as I once did."

You ask Peter, "What makes you think that the clerk at that store -- Harry, was it? -- what makes you think that Harry was the guy who shot you? Did you see him shoot you?"

Peter answers, "No, I didn't. But the local police told me that they suspect that Harry did the shooting."

You ask, "Did they interview Harry? Did he confess?"

Peter says, "I don't know for sure but I don't think so. The local newspaper reported that Harry disappeared after the shooting. I guess he fled."

You ask, "Why would he have shot you?"

Peter states, "I dunno. My guess is that he thought I was a robber and that he plugged me when I walked through the door that night."

You say, "That's malicious?"

Peter states, "Yeah, I think it was. Harry wasn't the kind of person who worried a lot about other people's welfare. He was kind of paranoid. He probably shot me because I wasn't walking right or because I was squinting my eyes. Who knows? But there's one thing I know for sure: Harry was a bad dude. He was bound to shoot somebody some day. Happy Valley Company had no business hiring him." 

You say, "What do you want me to do?"

Peter states, "Well, I'm not sure. That's why I came to you. What do you think we should do? Do you think we should sue Harry? Or maybe someone else? Happy Valley Company?"

You say, "Whoa! I think we're getting ahead of ourselves. We've got to figure out whether you've got a case. And I've got to figure out whether I want to take your case."

You think to yourself, "I wonder if I can trust this guy?"

You say, "Look. There are any number of possibilities and problems here.

My first problem is that you can't tell me everything I need to know. For example, I don't have enough information about why Harry shot you. My second problem is that I don't know enough about you or what you're after. And there are other things I've got to think about."

You think to yourself, "Well, what should I do? Should I spend another 30 minutes talking to this guy? Should I try to find Harry? Maybe I should slap a complaint together and take a deposition? But whose deposition? Heck, I don't even know the name or title of Peter's boss, and I don't know much about Happy Valley either. What's my theory? Perhaps respondeat superior {a legal doctrine making a "master" liable for certain acts of a "servant"}. But did Harry commit a crime? Or did Peter commit a crime?"

You then say, "Look, Peter. I'm not yet sure you've got a good case. I'll tell you what. You give me $1000 to look into the case a bit further. If I decide that your case isn't worth pursuing, I keep the $1000. If I decide that your case _is_ worth pursuing, I'll still keep the $1000. But if I do go ahead with your case and get a recovery for you, the $1000 will come out of my pocket. I work on a contingent fee basis. If I get a judgment or settlement for my client, I get 40%. You get 60%. The $1000 will come out of my 40%. But you pay courts costs as we go along. What do you say?"

Peter falls silent for about 20 seconds and then states, "O.k. I'll give you a check. But look, just one thing: I'm a bit steamed at Happy Valley. It shouldn't have hired Harry. Shouldn't we make trouble for Happy Valley?"

You say, "Well, if the case goes forward, we will. But look, Peter, your first concern is money. Don't worry about this revenge or just deserts stuff."

Peter replies, "Well, I'd just feel a lot better if Harry and Happy Valley were made to feel my pain."

****

Some questions: What sort of problem does Attorney a/k/a Slick face? Does Slick's job or task involve evidence? What evidence does Slick have? What is it worth? What should he do with it? What evidence should he look for? What should Slick do with the case? What should Slick do next? Does Peter know what he wants? Is Peter telling the truth? The whole truth? Does it matter? Where is Harry? Should Slick's next step focus on Harry? On Peter? On Happy Valley? Can "artificial intelligence" help Slick? How?

****

Detailed Symposium Program & Schedule

9:00 to 9:30: Introduction

David Schum, Professor of Operations Research and Engineering & Professor of Law, George Mason University, "Overview on AI and Related Disciplines: Applications in the Field of Law"

Peter Tillers, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, "Spotty Semiotics"

9:30-10:45: Inference and Proof in Judicial Settings

Moderator: Marilyn MacCrimmon, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia

David Schum, Professor of Operations Research and Engineering & Professor of Law, George Mason University

Marianne Belis, Professor, École Centrale d'Électronique and Paul Snow, Statistical Consultant

Commentators: Paolo Garbolino, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, School of Humanities, Scuola Normale Superiore, and Kola Abimbola, Copeland Research Fellow, Amherst College

11:00-12:15 : Decision Making and Inference under Dynamic Conditions

Moderator: Marianne Belis, Professor, École Centrale d'Électronique

Ronald Howard, Professor, Department of Engineering, Economic Systems and Operations Research & Professor, Graduate School of Business & Director, Decisions & Ethics Center, Stanford University

David Poole, Professor of Computer Science, University of British Columbia

1:45-3:00: Automated Systems

Moderator: Vern Walker, Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law

Kathryn Blackmond Laskey, Associate Professor of Systems Engineering and Operations Research, George Mason University

Ward Edwards, Professor Emeritus, University of Southern California & President, Wise Decisions, Inc.

3:15-4:30: Causality

Moderator: David Schum, Professor of Operations Research and Engineering & Professor of Law, George Mason University

Glenn Shafer, Professor, Department of Accounting and Information Systems, Graduate School of Management, Rutgers University

Vern Walker, Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law

Commentators: Melanie Leslie, Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University and Paolo Garbolino, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, School of Humanities, Scuola Normale Superiore

4:30-5:45 Wrap up Discussion: A Hypothetical Case: Attorney Slick

Moderator: Peter Tillers

David Poole

David Schum

Marianne Belis and Paul Snow

Ronald Howard