Consider a problem based on

SPENCER v. BRISTOL-MEYERS SQUIBB COMPANY, 156 N.J. 455, 720 A.2d 601 (Dec. 8, 1998)

This is an employment discrimination case.

Spencer, the plaintiff, is an older Black woman. She is an employee at BMS.

She interviews for a new position at BMS, a position in the marketing department.

The interview is with Poon, Gentile, and Oaks, marketing employees at BMS. Gentile is director of marketing. Oaks is vice-president of marketing. (Poon is only a grunt.)

After the interview, Spencer spoke with Walker, the director of human resources at BMS, and asked him how the interview went.

Spencer does not get the job.

Spencer sues; she beings a civil action against BRISTOL-MEYERS SQUIBB COMPANY.

Spencer claims that she was denied the job because of her race, her gender, and her age. (It’s a triple legal whammy.)

At the trial plaintiff’s counsel – Spencer's counsel – makes the following offer of evidence:

Spencer, the plaintiff, to testify that

Walker told her that

{he [Walker] had spoken with Poon ; and that}

Poon had said that he believed that Gentile and Oaks were concerned about Spencer because

Gentile and Oaks had told him, Poon, that

Dr. Neu, an influential father of an employee of BMS, had said to them he did not want an older black woman to be his daughter’s supervisor.

&&&

This looks like pretty rotten hearsay junk: in fact, it looks like hearsay several times over – perhaps four times over, and perhaps even five times over. So the evidence is clearly inadmissible. Correct?

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