Go to Links to Tillers' Online Papers and Notes
Some
of Tillers' papers
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Evidence: Law & Theory
Evidence: Technology & Theory
Breaking news! (March, 2008): MarshalPlan 2.2 has been released. To retrieve this "standalone" software, go to this web page and follow the instructions.
Loose Thoughts Stack (Windows)
Loose Thoughts Stack (Mac OSX)
This stack -- "Loose Thoughts" -- is one element of the experimental software MarshalPlan 2.1.
.Caveat: The buttons - links -- in the above Loose Thoughts stack do not work. Sorry! But most of the buttons in the MarshalPlan 2.2 stacks (including the Loose Thoughts stack) do work.
Go to Links to Tillers' Online Papers and Notes
General Interests
In recent decades there have been significant advances in the understanding of evidence and inference. One of my major interests is in making use of some of these advances to gain insights into evidence, inference, and proof in litigation. I have found it particularly useful to ponder Bayesianism, L.J. Cohen's theory of induction and proof, Glenn Shafer's theory of evidence and his theory of causality, inference networks, David Schum's theory of hierarchical inference, and the evolving views and ambitions of AI theorists. My general "take" on the nature of evidence and inference has been heavily influenced by my understanding of Kant's epistemology and its problems. I believe that Hegel (while making a hash of many things) and neo-Kantians such as Ernst Cassirer appropriately recognized that Kantian premises generate more contingency and subjectivity in human knowledge than Kant himself was willing to acknowledge.
A Philosophical Chestnut in Inferential Garb
There is a longstanding philosophical
debate about the relationship between "facts" and "values." This philosophical
chestnut takes a particularly interesting form in the context of evidence and
inference. Some theorists insist on a sharp distinction between descriptive theories
of inference and prescriptive or normative theories of inference. This distinction,
however, may be difficult to sustain if one thinks that whenever one describes
a form of inference one describes a form of reasoning or logic. Furthermore, close
study of inferential argument suggests that the source of many of the principles
or generalizations on which people rely when they draw inferences is as likely
to be culture as it is to be personal or scientific experience. Students of probability,
induction, and inference must in the future think more carefully than they have
in the past about the relationship between "rational inference" and matters such
as culture and "values." While I am no great fan of movements such as deconstruction,
there may be more than is generally acknowledged to the Hegelian idea than that
human societies and communities are grand experiments, tests, or wagers of the
viability or validity of particular "world views," views of the world that may
prove to be right (or wrong) but whose accuracy or adequacy cannot be demonstrated
while they are being "socially tested." I hope to further examine this
general question -- the relationship between "rational inference" and matters
such as culture, cultural values, prejudice, personal values, and personal beliefs
-- in the years to come. (I am now inclined to beleve that it is necessary to
pay close attention to the "natural" workings of the human organism. See P. Tillers,
"Are
There Universal Principles or Forms of Evidential Inference?," in J. Jackson,
M. Langer & P. Tillers, eds., Crime,
Procedure, and Evidence in a Comparative and International Context (Hart
Publishing, forthcoming 2008).)
Joint Report
(Testimony) of David A. Schum & Peter Tillers (Dec. 21, 1994)
in United
States of America versus Charles O. Shonubi

A conference on this topic was held at Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, on January 28-29, 2007.
Drafts and abstracts of many of the conference papers and comments are available online at http://tillers.net/conference.html.
Final versions of many of the above papers as well as some other related papers are available in the following special quadruple issue of Law, Probability and Risk:

Decisions, Decisions! :
Is systematic decision making about proof in litigation possible?
Dynamic Proof and Nonstationary Decision Making in Litigation:
A "Cartesian" Picture of the Process of Proof
On Probability and Uncertainty in Law:
Konstanz 2003 International Summer School Lecture Notes
On Creativity, Contamination, Time & Irreversibility in Proof
The Fabrication of Facts in Investigation and Adjudication
Artificial Intelligence and Judicial Proof:
How Can AI Contribute to the Study and Management of Forensic Investigation and Proof?
Links to Useful Evidence-Related Web Sites
Exclusively for hearsay aficionados!:
A Famous Hearsay Riddle Reconsidered & Reformulated
Hard Copy BOOKS & ARTICLES by Peter Tillers
Go to Links to Tillers' Online Papers and Notes
