Go to Links to Tillers' Online Papers and Notes

Some of Tillers' papers
are available on SSRN

The Dynamic Evidence Page

Peter Tillers, Esq. & Prof.

peter@tillers.net



What Is Evidence?




Heavenly Motion





The Golden Triad: Theory, Law & Technology



Evidence: Theory



Evidence: Law & Theory


 

Evidence: Technology & Theory



Peter Tillers & David Schum: A Theory of Preliminary Fact Investigation

&
MarshalPlan




Breaking news! (March, 2008): MarshalPlan 2.2 has been released. To retrieve this "standalone" software, go to this web page and follow the instructions.



Here is a device -- part of a system -- for sorting out, or organizing, your thoughts about a case or possible case:

Loose Thoughts Stack (Windows)

Loose Thoughts Stack (Mac OSX)

This stack -- "Loose Thoughts" -- is one element of the experimental software MarshalPlan 2.1.

Caveat: The buttons - links -- in the above Loose Thoughts stack do not work. Sorry! But most of the buttons in the MarshalPlan 2.2 stacks (including the Loose Thoughts stack) do work.
.



Tillers Blogs on Evidence and Inference — and Other Matters

 Go to Links to Tillers' Online Papers and Notes




General Interests

In recent decades there have been significant advances in the understanding of evidence and inference. One of my major interests is in making use of some of these advances to gain insights into evidence, inference, and proof in litigation. I have found it particularly useful to ponder Bayesianism, L.J. Cohen's theory of induction and proof, Glenn Shafer's theory of evidence and his theory of causality, inference networks, David Schum's theory of hierarchical inference, and the evolving views and ambitions of AI theorists. My general "take" on the nature of evidence and inference has been heavily influenced by my understanding of Kant's epistemology and its problems. I believe that Hegel (while making a hash of many things) and neo-Kantians such as Ernst Cassirer appropriately recognized that Kantian premises generate more contingency and subjectivity in human knowledge than Kant himself was willing to acknowledge.

 
 

A Philosophical Chestnut in Inferential Garb

There is a longstanding philosophical debate about the relationship between "facts" and "values." This philosophical chestnut takes a particularly interesting form in the context of evidence and inference. Some theorists insist on a sharp distinction between descriptive theories of inference and prescriptive or normative theories of inference. This distinction, however, may be difficult to sustain if one thinks that whenever one describes a form of inference one describes a form of reasoning or logic. Furthermore, close study of inferential argument suggests that the source of many of the principles or generalizations on which people rely when they draw inferences is as likely to be culture as it is to be personal or scientific experience. Students of probability, induction, and inference must in the future think more carefully than they have in the past about the relationship between "rational inference" and matters such as culture and "values." While I am no great fan of movements such as deconstruction, there may be more than is generally acknowledged to the Hegelian idea than that human societies and communities are grand experiments, tests, or wagers of the viability or validity of particular "world views," views of the world that may prove to be right (or wrong) but whose accuracy or adequacy cannot be demonstrated while they are being "socially tested." I hope to further examine this general question -- the relationship between "rational inference" and matters such as culture, cultural values, prejudice, personal values, and personal beliefs -- in the years to come. (I am now inclined to beleve that it is necessary to pay close attention to the "natural" workings of the human organism. See P. Tillers, "Are There Universal Principles or Forms of Evidential Inference?," in J. Jackson, M. Langer & P. Tillers, eds., Crime, Procedure, and Evidence in a Comparative and International Context (Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2008).)




Joint Report (Testimony) of David A. Schum & Peter Tillers (Dec. 21, 1994)
in United States of America versus Charles O. Shonubi





A conference on this topic was held at Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, on January 28-29, 2007.

Drafts and abstracts of many of the conference papers and comments are available online at http://tillers.net/conference.html.

Final versions of many of the above papers as well as some other related papers are available in the following special quadruple issue of Law, Probability and Risk:







 Thought in Progress:


 

Decisions, Decisions! :

Is systematic decision making about proof in litigation possible?

 


 

Dynamic Proof and Nonstationary Decision Making in Litigation:

 A "Cartesian" Picture of the Process of Proof

 




A Link to Temporal Logic



 

 On Probability and Uncertainty in Law:

Konstanz 2003 International Summer School Lecture Notes





More Thought in (Slow but Genuine) Progress:

 On Creativity, Contamination, Time & Irreversibility in Proof

The Fabrication of Facts in Investigation and Adjudication




Musings about the Purpose(s) of a Conference about
"Inference, Culture, and Ordinary Thinking in Dispute Resolution"





Yet More Thought in Progress:

Artificial Intelligence and Judicial Proof:

How Can AI Contribute to the Study and Management of Forensic Investigation and Proof?

 




 Links to Useful Evidence-Related Web Sites




Exclusively for hearsay aficionados!:

A Famous Hearsay Riddle Reconsidered & Reformulated




 

Hard Copy BOOKS  &  ARTICLES by Peter Tillers

 

 Go to Links to Tillers' Online Papers and Notes




Rings and Moon